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Broadly speaking, plans for the containment and treatment of pandemic flu lead to a set of
circumscribed outcomes, which include process outcomes (e.g., numbers of individuals
vaccinated, numbers of health care workers vaccinated, numbers of intensive care beds opened
up) as well as health outcomes (e.g., flu-related morbidity and mortality, transmission rates, and
attack rates).  Less well-known or researched are other health outcomes, such as excess
morbidity and mortality from untreated or undertreated illness and injury distinct from influenza,
and social outcomes related to such issues as increased crowding, health system congestion,
increasing scarcity of resources (including monetary resources), major population shifts, and
degradation of various workforces (health care, urban infrastructure such as police and
sanitation, critical infrastructure,etc.) with their consequent effects.
The New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness and Response Plan (July 2006) represents the “first-order” response to human-to-
human transmission of avian flu.  Community-level activities to be considered, as outlined in the
city’s plan, include increased surveillance at ports, transportation hubs, and within the health
care system; promotion of personal respiratory and hand hygiene; isolation of confirmed cases
and possible quarantine of confirmed contacts; the possible closure of schools; the possible
cancellation of public gatherings; and efforts to reduce crowding on mass transportation systems. 
A level of “second-order” consequences would involve individual and organizational responses
to first-order directives as well as responses to the ongoing and cumulative effects of the
pandemic.  For example, although it is unlikely that public authorities will purposefully close
mass transit in order to reduce transmission, it is possible that work shortages due to illness and
unwillingness to work may lead to transportation closures or curtailment.
As part of the larger NCDP project to consider the unanticipated consequences of pandemic flu
in New York City, the investigators are generally considering the following questions:
1. How will populations react to a pandemic flu?
2. How will populations react to non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI) such as
a. School closures?
b. Mass transportation curtailment or closure?
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i. What are demographics of ridership?
ii. What happened in previous transportation closures?
3. How will health systems be affected by NPIs?
a. Among their workforce
b. Institutionally and organizationally
4. What other systems will be affected by flu and by NPIs..., and how have systems
responded previously to major disruptions in critical infrastructure sectors?
a. Urban infrastructure
i. Sanitation
ii. Water and utilities
iii. Banking and finance
iv. First response (police, fire, EMS)
5. What are estimates of excess mortality and morbidity that are not caused by flu?
6. Is it possible to model “second-order” health and social consequences in an urban
environment such as NYC?
This initial literature review sought to identify evidence, theoretical frameworks, and other
supporting documentation from the peer-reviewed press, the “grey” literature of study reports
and public documents, and press reports that might inform the larger project, above and beyond
its direct association with transportation-related issues. We organized the literature review
around four major themes:
C Critical infrastructure loss
C Consequences of specific transportation shutdowns
C Social behavior related to elements of a pandemic, including historical evidence, survey
research on population attitudes and anticipated behavior, and workforce-related issues
C Health and social consequences of crowding and health system congestion, directly or
indirectly associated with pandemic flu and first-order responses.
Health, Social, and Economic Consequences of Critical Infrastructure Loss
The Northeast Blackout of 2003, which left eight US states and a Canadian province powerless
for eighteen hours in mid-August, and with reduced power for up to four days afterwards,
represents a very different type of disaster than does the accumulating morbidity and mortality of
a pandemic infectious disease, but it does afford a look at the impact of a major critical
infrastructure loss.  Whereas a pandemic will not independently cause such a critical
infrastructure loss, it is possible that the secondary effects of absenteeism and specific policy
actions (such as limits, curtailment, or closure of transportation systems) could potentially lead
to such massive infrastructure loss.  Even setting aside the low probability of a pandemic
resulting in such an infrastructure loss, it is valuable to consider the organizational and human
responses to the disaster environment.
Several articles and reports identified the impact on the health care system.  Although hospitals
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in NYC had emergency plans to switch their operations to emergency electrical generation, a
number of problems emerged, such as generator failures, insufficient fuel supply, hospital
elements (such as specific wards, air conditioning systems, or information and communication
systems) that were not hooked up to emergency electrical feeds, and loss of steam supply
(particularly critical for sterilizing equipment) (GNYHA testimony, 2003; C Torres, 2003).  A
number of hospitals reported difficulties communicating with their critical staff, who were
dependent upon cordless and cellular telephones rather than hard-wired phones (J Geodert,
2003).
Several after-action reports, press reports, and testimony noted that the 911 emergency dispatch
system experienced a brief disruption in the immediate aftermath of the electrical outage. 
Furthermore, there was an overall increase in ambulance runs throughout the EMS system; an
increase in emergency department (ED) visits for such complaints as respiratory difficulty
(anecdotally related to loss of air conditioning), cardiovascular events (anecdotally related to
people taking stairs rather than elevators), and renal issues experienced by dialysis patients who
could not receive treatment at their free-standing centers; an increase in hospital-based
laboratory and pharmacy services because patients could not access these services outside the
hospitals; and general seeking of shelter by elderly patients who needed relief from the heat or
access to stable food and water supplies (GNYHA, 2003; C Torres, 2003; M Sisson, 2003).  A
reported increase in diarrheal symptoms in ED visits was hypothesized to be related to
contaminated fish and meat that had been left unrefrigerated (MMWR).  The literature also
reported that a number of interfacility transfers were conducted, prompted by electrical failures
and concerns for the most critical patients (M Haberman and O Moritz, 2003; B Hamilton,
2003).  One press report featured a woman whose liver transplant was deferred (despite being
scheduled) because the surgical staff did not want to risk such a procedure, and the patient lost
her priority status on the transplantation list (D Grady, 2003).  One report of a busy urban
ambulance service in Yonkers NY indicated that EMS calls increased an average of 250% during
the first ten hours of the electrical outage, with an increase in presenting conditions related to the
heat, and to respiratory conditions secondary to loss of home-respiratory equipment.  Although
on-scene time increased by 63%, overall response and transport times were unaffected (DA Rand
et al, 2005).
The electrical outage also led to failures of city water treatment plants and pumping stations,
which led to a release of 490 million gallons of untreated water and sewage in to New York area
waters (Gennaro, 2003).  Area beaches were closed pending fecal coliform testing, and area
residents were warned not to fish the waters until they had been declared safe.
The economic impact of the electrical outage was estimated as approximately $6.4 billion in the
US and over $1 billion in NYC alone, which included a $250 million loss of perishable food,
$800 million lost in “gross city product” (wages, revenue, plus other factors), $40 million in tax
revenue, $10 million in overtime pay for city workers, and $7 million in lost mass transit fares
(Recchia, 2003).  Losses estimated for the city’s 22,000 restaurants were between $75 million
and $100 million in lost business and wasted food.
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The New York City Emergency Response Task Force issued a report with recommendations in
October 2003 that summarized many of the issues noted above within six broad themes –
emergency response, business continuity, the city as employer, communications, transportation,
and public health, safety and preparedness (A Alper and SL Kupferman, 2003) .  A number of
the problems and issues that the authors highlighted in reference to the particular critical
infrastructure loss of a major electrical outage are equally germane to disaster preparedness
planning for a pandemic flu: problems running and staffing command centers, inconsistent and
uncoordinated agency response plans, diffculties mobiling and deploying city employees and
other critical workforces and vendors, insufficient resources to handle long periods without
resupply, and inadequate communication across multiple networks (first response, city agencies
to one another, city to the business community, etc.).   Among the vulnerable populations singled
out for particular attention was homebound citizens; the city’s disabled population is estimated at
1 million, including 15,000 homebound seniors and an estimated 68,000 who received city-
administered homecare services.
Transportation shutdowns
Similar to the electrical outage noted above, the 60-hour NYC transit strike that occurred in
December 2005 represents a significant critical infrastructure loss to the city.  As one of the
largest mass transit systems in the world, the NYC subway system handles an average of 4
million riders during weekdays and the bus ridership averages 2.5 million per day (NYC Transit
Committee, 2003).  The economic impact of the strike, mostly from lost revenue, was estimated
as ranging from $250 to $400 million per day.  The literature review did not uncover any reports
published to date that estimated the health or social costs or consequences of the 2005 transit
strike, although one news report did indicate that the levels of air particulate matter increased
slightly during the course of the three-day strike, which might have been related to increased
automobile and truck traffic during the midday hours (DeStefano, 2006).
One research study did examine the effects of a three-week mass transit bus strike in
Minneapolis, Minnesota in 1996 on “no-show” rates at a large university-affiliated teaching
hospital.  The author analyzed no-show rates prior to and after the strike as well as during the
strike, and reported them by clinical setting (internal medicine, specialty care, nursing care, ED). 
The patient population was largely urban and impoverished, with over 70% of the patients
having household incomes below $20,000.  The author hypothesized that the transit strike would
significantly increase the no-show rate and decrease the number of appointments because of
transportation access barriers, however he found no significant differences of “strike” versus
“non-strike” except for patients scheduled to see a nurse for a non-urgent issue.  He concluded
that the strike had a negligible impact on health service utilization, in that patients either used
more costly taxis or private transportation or delayed appointments until the strike was over
(Pheley, 1999).
Social behavior during a pandemic
In contrast to the negative, dysfunctional images of disaster behavior – panic, disorder, and
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helplessness –  empirical research suggests that behavior in disaster situations is adaptive and
problem focused (K Tierney et al, 2001). Pro-social, rather than anti-social, behavior seems to be
the norm. Behavior in emergency situations is strongly influenced by pre-emergency behavior
patterns.  One major exception to this pattern involves anti social behavior, which tends to
decline during the post disaster emergency response phase. Crime rates tend to decline following
large scale disasters (M Lindell and R Perry, 1992), and contrary to common wisdom it has
never been necessary to declare martial law after a US disaster. 
The city’s pandemic flu plan relies, in part,  upon voluntary social isolation and prevention
efforts to limit influenza transmission.  Although it is unknown how the city’s population will
respond to a pandemic, recent survey research offers some guidance on potential behavior.  A
recent national random-digit-dial telephone survey (n=1,697, oversampling households with
children under 18), asked respondents about their willingness and ability to comply with public
health directives (RJ Blendon et al, 2006).  Virtually all respondents (94%) indicated they would
stay at home for 7-10 days if they had the flu and 85% said that all members of the household
would stay at home if any household member had the flu.  One quarter of the respondents,
though, said they had no one to care for them if they were home with the flu, and this varied
considerably by income, with 36% of individuals living in a household earning under $25,000 in
annual income having no one to care for them, compared to 15% of individuals in households
with greater than $75,000 annual household income.  Furthermore, although a majority of
respondents would stay at home for 7-10 days if public health officials thought they were
exposed to others with the disease (86%), a large number (27%) thought they might lose their
job or business if they stayed at home for that length of time.  This concern for job loss was
greatest among Hispanic respondents (53%), black respondents (41%), and all respondents
earning less than $25,000 in annual household income (41%).  Overall, 25% of employed
respondents said they would suffer serious financial problems if they had to miss work for 7-10
days, 57% would suffer a problem if they had to miss one month, and 76% would suffer a
serious financial problem if they had to miss work for 3 months.
In a survey of 6,248 New York City health care workers, respondents were asked if they were
able and willing to work given one of several circumstances, ranging from a weather emergency,
to bioterrorism, to an environmental disaster, to an untreatable infectious disease outbreak such
as SARS (K Qureshi et al, 2005).  Responses varied widely depending on the particular event. 
Whereas 80 to 82% of respondents indicated their ability to work in the event of an explosion or
environmental disaster, only 64 to 68% were able to work in the face of a smallpox, radiation, or
infectious disease event.  In terms of willingness to work, respondents were overwhelmingly
willing to work in a snow blizzard, an explosion, or an environmental disaster (80 to 86%) and
least willing to work in response to a SARS-like event (48%).  In a multivariate regression
analysis, the factors most associated with an unwillingness to report to work included being
female, being under 45 years, and having either childcare or eldercare obligations.
Health and social consequences of crowding and health system congestion
Two social consequences of a pandemic flu outbreak that may be anticipated are increased
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crowding within households and neighborhoods, and increased congestion at health-care
facilities.  Crowding will likely occur as a consequence of several factors, including school and
tranportation closures or restrictions, sick household members, workplace closures (or an
unwillingness of household members to go to work), closings of congregate venues such as
movie theaters, travel restrictions, and a general unwillingness to venture far from home in an
uncertain environment.  Health-care congestion will likely occur at larger facilities (principally
hospitals and clinics) as private facilities close or curtail hours (including medical offices, labs,
and pharmacies), as individuals seek care for flu and non-flu-related illnesses and injuries, and as
medical facilities redeploy personnel to handle a shifting patient volume and type.  
Risk behavior and violence
Research has shown that children tend to engage in risky behavior during unstructured and
unsupervised time.  The after-school hours are the peak time for juvenile crime and risky
behaviors such as alcohol and drug use (Juvenile Justice Bulletin, 1999). For example, the peak
hour for juvenile crime is from 3 p.m. to 4 p.m., the first hour that most students are dismissed
from school (see chart, ibid). Consequently, one of the unintended consequences of the
community safety protocol of school closure could be increase in risky behavior by youth. 
In addition to the potential for increases in juvenile crime, one research study suggests that
children may be at greater risk for child abuse and traumatic brain injury after a natural disaster,
which the authors hypothesize to be associated with mental health distress and “disruption of the
social fabric” (HT Keenan et al, 2004).  
For others, isolation and/or quarantine would result in increased sedentary activity/TV watching.
Increased television watching has been shown to be associated with childhood obesity  (In
multiple logistic regression, the odds ratio of children having a BMI >85th percentile was 1.06
(95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.004–1.11) for each additional hour per day of TV/video
viewed, independent of child age, child sex, parental educational attainment, and race/ethnicity)
(B Dennison et al, 2002). 
In a study of over 500 youth in NYC (age 13-20), 80% reported signficant exposure to at least 1
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form of media coverage of September 11th. These rates were comparable with the citywide
survey of public school students in New York City conducted by the New York City Department
of Education. Results of a structural equation model that included controls for previous levels of
mental health and social attitudes, as well as a range of demographic factors, indicated that
media exposure predicted posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms in the youth. (Gershoff and
Aber, 2004).
 
Loss of Individual Privacy/Crowding within the home 
One particular human reaction to crowding is the tendency of individuals to withdraw from
others in order to reduce stimuli; many times this is a protective mechanism. Social withdrawal
in response to acute crowding can be an effective coping strategy for reducing short term stress
(G Evans et al, 2000).  Some research indicates there may be a threshold effect and only after
that point does the density effect come into play (a little bit of crowding could be incorporated
into the family structure and routine, but at some tipping point, whether that be in time or
space—the crowding could become more than “inconvenient”)   One study looking at the
relationship between crowding and withdrawal found that the lowest levels of density lead to a
reduction in withdrawal up to a point, after which the effect becomes increasing positive (W
Regoeczi, 2002).
In addition to social withdrawal, close proximity of others may cause difficulties in routine
behaviors (W Regoeczi, 2002) which would be an inconvenience. However, would the effects of
crowding within a household be more severe? The view that living in a crowded environment is
unhealthy is well supported by research on animal populations; there is clear evidence of a
“density effect”.  (The “density effect” includes increased aggression, heightened mortality and
reduced fertility)  Empirically demonstrating harmful effects of crowding among humans is more
difficult (W Regoeczi, 2002); however, one study did demonstrate that chronic exposure to
residential crowding is associated with increased levels of psychological distress (S Lepore, G
Evans, and M Palsane, 1991). An additional cost of high density living appears to be heightened
vulnerability to the demands of relatively minor social hassles. People exposed to social hassles
may experience ill effects only if their adaptive capacities have been compromised by chronic
strain.
Psychological stressors within families could become intensified due to being contained in close
quarters. Boredom, depression and stress could occur. People could become unable to cope with
minor daily hassles—which in turn, could affect drug and alcohol (as they are coping
mechanisms which people use to self medicate against these factors)  Alcohol and drug abuse
can result in violent behavior within families and communities and therefore, as stress levels in
homes increase, domestic violence rates could also increase. From analysis of data in US and
Canada, violence against women does seem to increase after natural disasters (E Enarson, 1999).
This could be particularly acute in families or communities in which the baseline level for
domestic violence is already high. For example, in a study of risk factors for domestic violence
in South Africa, crowding alone was not associated with violence.  Domestic violence is most
strongly associated to the status of women in a society and to the normative use of violence in
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conflict situations.  Consequently, if a neighborhood with high rates of domestic violence is
subjected to quarantine, it is likely that domestic violence rates would increase (R Jewkes, J
Levin, and P Loveday, 2002).
Stigmatization of individuals in quarantined area 
Because of their evolving nature and inherent scientific uncertainties, outbreaks of emerging
infectious diseases can be associated with considerable fear in the general public or in specific
communities, especially when illness and deaths are substantial (B Person et al, 2004).
In 1993 an outbreak of hantavirus infection in the Four Corners area (where the borders of four
states—Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and Colorado—meet) of the United States was initially
referred to by reporters as a Navajo disease, which led to severe fear, stigmatization, and
discrimination of Native Americans in the region (CDC, MMWR 1993). Previous scientific
studies have shown that fear associated with stigmatization and discrimination has negatively
affected public health efforts with chronic conditions and diseases such as mental illness,
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, leprosy, and epilepsy (B Schulze and MC Angermeyer, 2003; GM
Herek, 2002; JW Carey et al, 1997; JS MacLeod and JK Austin, 2003). 
Mental health issues during a pandemic 
Research following a natural disaster indicated that persons with Severe Mental Illness (SMI)
were resilient if they were able to continue to receive treatment after the disaster (KR Lachance
et al, 1994).  The comprehensiveness of the services received and the ability to maintain those
services through the disaster (in which staff members took extraordinary measures to ensure
continued care) were the key reasons why these participants functioned well after the disasters. If
people with SMI are unable to continue treatment due to quarantine, psychiatric decompensation
could occur. 
Research on middle-aged women during the SARS epidemic in Hong Kong suggests that there
are increases in depression, associated in part with feeling scared, sleeping poorly, and having
suffered financial losses (HYR Yu et al, 2005).  A large household study conducted in Taiwan
immediately after SARS had been controlled compared impacted populations, measured as
having friends or family who had been infected or quarantined, with a non-impacted population. 
The researchers reported that the impacted group had higher levels of depression, poorer
neighborhood relationships, poorer self-perceived health, and personal economic losses than did
the non-impacted individuals (CH Ho et al, 2006).  
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